Civil Procedure: Suit Against National Bank to Cancel Mortgage and Note Held to Be Local Action Maintainable Outside District Where Bank Is Established by unknown
NATIONAL BANK TO CANCEL MORTGAGE
AND NOTE HELD TO BE LOCAL ACTION
MAINTAINABLE OUTSIDE DISTRICT
WHERE BANK IS ESTABLISHED
In Chateau Lafayette Apartments, Inc. v. Meadow Brook
National Bank' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
a suit to cancel or reform a mortgage and mortgage note was a local
action which fell within an exception to the national bank venue
statute; and thereby allowed a national bank located in New York
to be sued in a federal district court in Louisiana? In 1965 Chateau
Lafayette Apartments executed a note payable to bearer and secured
by a real mortgage on its Louisiana apartment house. Meadow
Brook National Bank, located in New York, became the bearer of
the note, and in 1967 Chateau Lafayette filed suit in a Louisiana
district court against the bank, alleging that the interest rate charged
on the loan was usurious under federal, law.4 It requested that the
court order a refund of all interest paid under the note and declare
all future interest payments uncollectible. The bank's motion for
dismissal on grounds of improper venue under 12 U.S.C. § 94 was
granted. Since the action was transitory, section 94 allowed it only
in the district where the bank was established. In an amended
complaint, Chateau Lafayette prayed that the mortgage note and the
mortgage itself "be cancelled and erased from the public records of
Lafayette Parish," 5 or, in the alternative, that the mortgage and note
be reformed to delete any encumbrance on the immovable property.
The bank renewed its motion to dismiss, but this time it was denied,
the court holding that in requesting cancellation or reformation of
the mortgage, the amended complaint stated a local action, making
venue proper. This ruling was appealed,' and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, one judge dissenting.
'416 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1969).
'Venue of suits
Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had in any
district or Territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such
association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the
county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.
12 U.S.C. § 94 (1964).
For discussion of the exception to section 94 created by Casey v. Adams. 102 U.S. 66 (1880).
see notes 15-18 infra and accompanying text.
3See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
'The usury provisions of the National Bank Act are 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 (1964).
-416 F.2d at 303.
'The Fifth Circuit permitted an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
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CIVIL PROCEDURE: SUIT AGAINST
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The venue of actions involving national banks is governed by 12
U.S.C. § 94, rather than 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), 7 the general federal
venue statute for corporations. Section 94 applies to suits in state
as well as federal courts, a curious result of the fact that national
banks, though privately owned and managed, are federal
"instrumentalities" in that they are federally chartered and under
the supervision of the United States Comptroller of the Currency. 8
A national bank is a citizen of the state where it is -established only
for the purposes of federal court diversity jurisdiction,' and it is
"established" and may be sued. only in "the district in which [it]
has its principal place of business and which contains the place
recited in its charter . ... -"0 This venue privilege is far narrower
than that enjoyed by corporations generally, as national banks are
free from the "doing business" tests and multijurisdictional liability
to suit confronting corporations under section 1391 (c)."1 The section
94 "venue sanctuary"' 2 for national banks is apparently the result
of an early congressional policy to protect them from the potentially
disruptive effects which suits in distant forums could have on
banking operations and currency stability. 3 One of the principal
effects of section 94 has been to give national banks a competitive
advantage over state banks, which have no such venue protection. 4
Despite the unequivocal language of the statutory provision, the
Supreme Court held in Casey v. Adamst 5 that it applied only to
transitory actions. In Case v a mortgagee brought suit in a state
court in one Louisiana parish against the receiver of a national
-(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated
or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be
regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1964).
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1964). See generally Wille. State Banking: .4 Study in Dual
Regulation, 31 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 733, 735, 742 n.27 (1966).
.'Ch. 290. § 4. 22 Stat. 163 (1882).
"Leonardi v. Chase Nat'l Bank. 81 F.2d 19. 22 (2d Cir.). cert. denied. 298 U.S. 677 (1936).
accord. Bauffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir.). cert. denied. 342 U.S. 944
(1951).
"See I J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.142 [5.-3] (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
MooRE].
1 See generally Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks. 34 GEo.
WAsM. L. REv. 765 (1966).
"The National Bank Act, so named in 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1964). was originally titled "An
Act to Provide a National Currency. ch. 106, § 1. 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
"Wille, supra note 8. at 742.
Is102 U.S. 66 (1880).
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banking association located in another parish to have erased from
the public records a prior mortgage on land purchased at a sheriff's
sale. Relief was granted in the state courts and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed, stating that "[l]ocal actions are in the
nature of suits in rem, and are to be prosecuted where the thing on
which they are founded is situated."" As its reason for fashioning
this local action exception to the venue provision, the Court
explained: "[We see nowhere in the Banking Act any evidence of
an intention on the part of Congress to exempt banks from the
ordinary rules of law affecting the locality of actions founded on
local things."1 7 A literal construction of the venue section would
have, in effect, declared that a national bank could not be sued at
all in a local action where the real property involved was not in the
district where the bank was located. "Such a result could never have
been contemplated by Congress.""8
Neither the federal courts nor Congress have ever arrived at a
clear definition of the terms "local" and "transitory."" The venue
provision of the Judiciary Act of 178920 did not recognize any
separate venue for local actions, but a distinction between local and
transitory actions was judicially drawn at an early date.2' Although
the current general venue statute2 fails to distinguish clearly between
the two types of actions, the statute has nonetheless been held to
apply only to -transitory actions.23 A few specific federal venue
provisions do distinguish between the two types of actions 2' and
actions for the forfeiture of property,25 partition of real estate where
the United States is a cotenantt2 and condemnation of property for
use by the United Statesl must be brought in the federal judicial




11 See Mooa 0.142 [2.-]; Note, Local Actions in the Federal Courts. 70 HARv. L. REv.
708 (1957).
"Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
21 Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (No. 8411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811).
-28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964).
n Pllerin Laundry Mach. Sales Co. v. Hogue, 219 F. Supp. 629, 637 (D. Ark. 1963);
see Smith v. Landis, 211 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1954). See generally MooRE 0.142 [5.-3].
-428 U.S.C. §§ 1392, 1393, 1655 (1964).
-28 U.S.C. § 1395 (1964).
"28 U.S.C. § 1399 (1964).
-28 U.S.C. § 1.403 (1964).
1306 [Vol. 1969:1304
CIVIL PROCEDURE
authority, the federal courts in diversity cases will generally apply
the law of the forum state to determine if a particular action is local
or transitory.ss The point is essentially an academic one, however,
since "there is little difference between the definition in most states
and that arrived at without reference to state law in such early
federal cases as Livingston v. Jefferson . . ."2, The distinction
between local and transitory actions is generally regarded as the
distinction between actions in rem and in personah,3 0 with in rem
actions including those to "remove an incumbrance or lien or cloud
upon the title to property." 3' Article 80 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure 2 is typical of state procedural rules requiring that
in rei actions be brought in the county or district where the land is
situated. There is considerable authority for the general proposition
that a suit to cancel a mortgage is such a local action. 33 In
determining whether a given action is local or transitory, however,
the courts have not confined themselves to a mechanical
categorization of the action as in rem or in personam, but rather
have adopted the approach that "[t]he character of the remedy
sought should be determinative."34 One court has used this approach
to formulate the following test: "Whether an action is in personam
or in rem is not the ultimate test as to whether an action is
local . . . . The test is, does the action involve necessarily a
determination of a right or interest in real estate?"I'
Having carved the local action exception from section 94 in
n MOORE 0.142 [2.-1].
5 70 HARv. L. Rv., supra note 19, at 710.
'MOORE 0.142 [2.-I].
"The most notable exception to this general statement is that certain in personam actions
involving injury to real property, such as trespass, are also local in nature. MOORE 0.142
[2.-1] & n.8.
"The following actions shall be brought in the parish where the immovable property is
situated:
(I) An action to assert an interest in immovable property, or a right in, to, or against
immovable property, except as otherwise provided in Articles 72 and 2633; and
(2) An action to partition immovable property, except as otherwise provided'in
Articles 81, 82, and 83.
If the immovable property, consisting of one or more tracts, is situated in more than one
parish, the action may be brought in any of these parishes. LA. CODE Cv. PRoc. ANN. art.
80 (West 1960).
3E.g.. Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66 (1880); Whalen v. Ring, 224 Iowa 267, 276 N.W. 409
(1937); Kommer v. Harrington, 83 Minn. 114, 85 N.W. 939 (1901).
'MOORE 0.142 [2.-I].
3sWhalen v. Ring, 224 Iowa 267, 272, 276 N.W. 409,412 (1937).
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Casey v. Adams- the Supreme Court has not since addressed itself
to the same question. In Bank of America v. Whitne' Central
National Bank"' a New York state bank sued a Louisiana national
bank in a New York federal court. The district court held that the
national bank was not suable in New York because it had no place
of business, resident officers, or employees there. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed on jurisdictional grounds, expressly
avoiding the venue question. 7 In its most recent pronouncements on
section 94, the Court has resolved a different controversy, holding
that the provisions of section 94 are mandatory rather than
permissive. In 1963 the Court found the statutory language
"appropriate. . . for the purpose of specifying the precise courts in
which Congress consented to have national banks subject to
suit . . .," and, in language difficult'to reconcile with Casey', stated
that "we believe Congress intended that in those courts alone could
a national bank be sued against its will."' 3' This case made no
mention of the local action exception, but three weeks later in
Michigan National- Bank v. Robertson" the Court confined Casey
to its facts by distinguishing Robertson 'from Casey and commented
that "by its very nature, this is a considerably different suit from
the one to determine interests in property at its situs which was
involved in Casey v. Adams."" Congress, the Court continued,
"clearly intended 12 U.S.C. § 94 to apply to suits involving usury
and the related matters at issue here.1 2 Thus, although the Court
has not overruled Casey, the above recent cases suggest that a
restrictive approach should be taken in applying the Casey doctrine.
Despite the implications of this recent trend, the Fifth Circuit
in Chateau Lafayette determined that section 94 was inapplicable
and upheld local venue. In addressing itself to the issue of whether
the amended complaint stated a local action, the court noted initially
that it was "Erie-bound to apply Louisiana substantive and
procedural concepts (this being a nonfederal case, and achievement
-261 U.S. 171 (1923).
VId. at 173.
'Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 560 (1963).
39Id. (emphasis added). Although Langdeau narrowly concerned a national bank being sued
in a state court, the holding was applied equally to federal court actions in Bruns, Nordeman
Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1968).
A-372 U.S. 591 (1963).
"Id. at 594.
aid.
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of nationwide uniformity being thus of no moment) . . . ,,11 The
court reasoned that the amended complaint, in praying for
cancellation or reformation of a real mortgage, asserted "'an interest
in immovable property, or a right in, to, or against immovable
property"" and that under state law' s the action could only be
brought in the parish where the land was located. The court also
observed that the effect of the remedy sought was "virtually. .. the
same" 46 as the remedy sought in Casey, and that to constitute a local
action, it was sufficient that "one of its primary effects. . . be upon
the real property subject to the mortgage. '47 The bank argued that,
under Louisiana law,48 a mortgage is accessory to the debtor's
obligation to repay the loan evidenced here by the mortgage note and
that when the 'debt obligation is extinguished the mortgage
disappears with it. The court conceded this but concluded that a
partial extinguishment of the debt does not mean that the entire
mortgage disappears, nor does it mean that a mortgage-debtor
cannot sue to cancel or reform a mortgage note and concurrently
erase the mortgage from the public records in whole or in part. The
court refused to consider that the plaintiff could simply have sued
on the note, rendering the action transitory, and refused to consider
what relief was actually sought by the remedy requested; rather, the
court looked strictly at the wording of the amended complaint. The
dissenting judge noted49 that the relief sought affected real property
but concluded that the test of whether an action is local or transitory
should not be the ultimate effect on real property but rather whether
the action was in rein. The dissent's view was that the action was
principally one to alter a contractual relationship, not to alter the
nature of a cloud on title to real estate. Moreover, the considerations
relevant in CaseY were found by the dissent to be absent in Chateau
Lafayette, since in the principal case a New York federal court could
have granted the relief actually sought without having jurisdiction
over the real property incidentally involved.50
The Chateau Lafayette decision is a significant liberalization of
1416 F.2d at 305 n.13.
'Id. at 304.
'3See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
"416 F.2d at 304.
4id. at 305 (emphasis added).
" See generally LK. CIv*. CODE ANN. arts. 1771, 3284-85, 3371-85 (West 1952).
41416 F.2d at 306 (Ainsworth, J.. dissenting).
561d.
Vol. 1969: 1304] 1309
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
the statutory venue restrictions on litigation involving national banks
and could destroy in large part the "sanctuary" established by
section 94. Here, a case initiated purely as a usury action and which
would normally be governed by the provisions of section 94 was
allowed to escape those provisions by a careful rewording of the
complaint. Although there is uniform authority that a suit fo cancel
a real mortgage is a local action,5 on which basis the Chateau
Lafayette decision may appear to be proper, there is no authority
directly on the specific point raised by the amended complaint. The
instant case presents a mixed rather than a real action under
Louisiana law, 52 having been brought to effect cancellation of both
the note, a personal action, and the mortgage, a real action. The
court passes lightly over this obstacle, claiming that "no Solomonic
split of the action's two prime components-(l) nullifying usury and
(2) effecting reformation of the note and mortgage-can be
effected, 53 and then announces the new doctrine, totally without
precedent, that to qualify as a local action it is only necessary that
one of the primary effects of the action will be on interests in real
property.54 With respect to the Chateau Lafayette situation it is
instructive to note that some courts have drawn the line between
local and transitory actions on the basis of whether the action was
founded, respectively, on privity of estate or privity of contract. 5
Furthermore, it has been widely recognized that where rights to real
property depend on the outcome of a controversy concerning a
personal obligation, the fact that the judgment sought will
incidentally affect those rights will not make the action local," nor
will the form of process used to initiate an action change its nature.57
The dissenting judge is rightfully troubled by the fact that, despite
the wording of the amended complaint, the "[a]ppellee seeks only
to alter the nature of his contractual relationship with
appellant .. . ."I' Certainly the dissent is also correct in observing
'ISee note 33 supra.
"LA. CODE CiV. PROC. ANN. art. 422 (West 1960).
u416 F.2d at 305.
uSee text accompanying note 47 supra. See also text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
'E.g.. N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Hudson County, 117 N.J. L. 534, 537, 189 A. 400, 402 (1937);
accord. Mutzig v. Hope, 176 Ore. 368, 374, 158 P.2d 110, 113 (1945).
"See Laurel Crest, Inc. v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. App.2d 69, 74, 44 Cal. Rptr, 867, 871
(1965); Vaughan v. Roberts, 45 Cal. App. 2d 246, 255-56, 113 P.2d 884, 889-90 (1941); Jarvis
v. Hamilton, 73 Idaho 131, 133-34, 246 P.2d 216, 217-18 (1952).
"Burns v. Duncan, 23 Tenn. App. 374, 385, 133 S.W.2d 1000, 1006 (1939).
"416 F.2d at 306.
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that the considerations present in Casey are absent in Chateau
Lafayette: should the Louisiana district court rule adversely to
plaintiff, he is free to travel to New York and prosecute his usury
allegations there,5' whereas the plaintiff in Casey had no such option.
In light of the significant percentage of bank loans which are secured
by mortgages or security deeds on realty lying outside of the judicial
district in which the bank is located, the effect of Chateau Lafayette
is to allow numerous actions against a national bank to be
prosecuted in a forum more convenient to the plaintiff than section
94 would allow. The propriety of this result is at best questionable
in view of the Supreme Court's apparent determination to give
section 94 a literal reading and rigidly confine the Casey doctrine to
its fact situation. The underlying policy of section 94" appears to
be outdated and subject to argument," gives national banks a
competitive advantage over state banks,62 and produces possible
inconvenience to a plaintiff if applied literally. Nevertheless,
legislative debate and honest discussion of the issues by the courts
seem preferable to the silent negation of federal legislation present
in the Chateau Lafayette decision.
"See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
"34 GEo. WAsH. L. R v., supra note 12, at 772.
"See Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591,595 (1963) (Black, J.. concurring).
'See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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